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R2P: a counter-genocidal 
strategy of peace?
 — Salvatore Loddo
Abstract: Since 2001, the doctrine of the responsibility to pro-
tect (R2P) became a new global standard, a norm that resha-
pes the right to humanitarian intervention by international 
community in response to grave international crimes commit-
ted by States. This article shows the function of R2P as coun-
tergenocidal strategy for peace bringing out the conceptual 
and moral premises of its emergence and it lays bare, through 
the Syrian and Iraqi cases of contemporary wars, the para-
dox between the fundamental commitment to prevent mass 
violence and the danger to betray this obligation flattening 
R2’s applications to new western way of war consistent with 
liberal way of peace.
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Responsibility to protect: a new global standard
In September 2001, after the shock provoked by the jihadist attack on 
the Twin Towers in New York City, a doctrine of international relations 
appeared that intended to give a new approach to the delicate issue of 
the “right of humanitarian intervention”: is it appropriate to intervene co-
ercively against a state that threatens the very life of its own citizens? If 
this right is legitimate, who should exercise it, under what authority, when, 
how and where? In the Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty, the “responsibility to protect” is based on 
the fundamental idea that «[…] sovereign states have a responsibility to 
protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass mur-
der and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or una-
ble to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community 
of states» (ICISS Report 2001, viii). After the end of World War II, but also 
during the previous century if one considers the proclamation of the norm 
in opposition to the “Holy Alliance” promoted by Louis Philippe of Orleans, 
the relations between states have always been governed by the “principle 
of non-intervention”. This principle is clearly stated in the Charter of the 
United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945): «All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the Uni ted 
Nations» (3). This rule of international coexistence is also reaffirmed in the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (1970) in which it is proclaimed that «States shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations […]. Such a 
threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of 
settling international issues» (A/RES/25/2625, 3-4).
The doctrine of the R2P entails a radical change of perspective: the 
population, and not the State, is the central element according to which 
sovereignty, as control, is redefined in terms of State responsibility. Here it 
is evident that the project of the members of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty is to attempt to set aside the modern 
concept of sovereignty. Before then sovereignty was intended solely as a 
legal quality referred exclusively to the government through which it was 
possible to exercise an original and independent power of control over all 
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juridical and real individuals living within its territorial sphere. Instead, in 
the perspective of the R2P, sovereignty coincides with responsibility, in-
tended mainly in three ways. First, as the responsibility of State authorities 
regarding their function of protecting the safety and the lives of citizens 
and the promotion of their welfare. Second, as an internal responsibility 
towards its own citizens and as an external responsibility towards the in-
ternational community through UN membership and international legal 
obligations. Third, as the responsibility of State authorities who have to 
be held responsible and accounted for all of their actions, even in the case 
of lack of action. In this way, State sovereignty can be revoked whenever 
the policies of the ruling authorities does not ensure the security and the 
well-being of citizens, and when basic needs are unmet and fundamental 
rights are violated. Whenever the international community – may it be 
the UN Secretary-General, an activist of Amnesty International or the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights – evaluates the capability of cer-
tain governments to ensure adequate living conditions, a moral principle 
of the respect for human dignity is at work. The assertion of this principle 
is not merely, from a legal point of view, the product of the internatio nal 
legal system of human rights and humanitarianism, but also the outcome 
of the condition of being spectators of global human suffering (see Bauman 
2015). In this way, sovereignty can be passed on from those who detain it 
legitimately or even arbitrarily, to those who at an international level takes 
the responsibility for those who didn’t meet the requirements defined by 
the international community. In fact, since the main responsibility for the 
protection of the population is supposed to be on the State itself, when-
ever the people of a given State are damaged or put at risk by «internal 
war, insurgency, repression or State failure» and the State in question is 
unwilling or unable to prevent or stop what is underway, the internatio-
nal responsibility to protect takes over the principle of non-interference 
in internal affairs. Following from this, the R2P functions in three ways. 
First, as responsibility to prevent, in operating on both the direct and root 
causes of internal conflicts and crisis. Second, as responsibility to react, 
in responding to situations of compelling human need with appropriate 
measures, which may include coercive measures such as sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases even military interven-
tion. And finally, as responsibility to rebuild, in providing full assistance for 
recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation after a military intervention 
(ICISS Report 2001, xi).
Considering the mutating subject of revocable sovereignty, is it there-
fore possible to say in these cases of suspension of sovereignty that – quo-
ting Carl Schmitt – «sovereign is who decides on the state of exception»? 
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(Schmitt 1972, 33). In these circumstances the state of exception corre-
sponds to a certain degree of incapability for which a government can no 
longer be considered as an independent and responsible “sovereign”, and 
also it corresponds to a breach within the international system of human 
rights and humanitarian law. The new sovereign subject is the UN Security 
Council, as the main location where the decisions on the strategy for en-
suring human protection are adopted. Here, the state of exception is de-
clared by using expressions such as “crisis”, “humanitarian disaster”, “de-
fault”, “state failure”, “genocide”, “atrocities”, etc. In reality, the use of these 
terms does not always consider their semantic value (and the resulting 
public resonance) since the purpose behind this choice of words is mainly 
to catch wide attention on tragedies, since at stake there is the respect for 
human dignity or an alleged or actual threat to international peace and se-
curity. Therefore, sovereignty can be delegitimized and revoked in the case 
of violation of the norms of international law - such as the right to life, the 
right of personal security – and also in the case of alleged or actual threats 
to “human security” (see UNDP Report 1994). Protecting civilians, victims 
of abuse, is the key objective of R2P, but its main priority is supposed to 
be prevention. «Military intervention for human protection purposes» – 
an expression preferred to “humanitarian intervention” since it has been 
widely compromised after the KFOR mission in Kosovo – is an exceptional 
and extraordinary measure, legitimate only in the case of «large scale loss 
of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, 
or a failed state situation» or in the case of «large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, 
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, 
acts of terror or rape» (ICISS Report 2001, xii). Or, as it is affirmed in a more 
broad sense in §139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (2005): 
«The responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to 
help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity» (A/60/L.1, 31). The “just cause threshold” for 
military intervention is defined by inspections to verify the possibility of 
imminent or ongoing mass atrocities. The “military intervention for human 
protection purposes” is also regulated by precautionary principles – such 
as right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects 
– concepts all directly derived from the idea of a “just war” conceived by 
a “just authority”, represented by the UN Security Council, in accordance 
with certain operational principles.
Three pillars sustain the architecture of the R2P. First, the responsibil-
ity of a given State to protect its people. Second, the commitment of the 
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international community to provide assistance through inter-state cooper-
ation, regional and sub-regional bodies, civil society, private sector and UN 
bodies. And third, the responsibility of the members of the United Nations 
to collectively respond promptly and decisively when the State in question 
is manifestly incapable of providing protection (A/63/677). Therefore, on 
the one hand, the responsibility to protect works with non-coercive means 
such as mediation and preventive diplomacy, advocacy, inspections and 
commissions of inquiry, observation and monitoring missions, and referral 
to the ICC in the case of alleged crimes. On the other hand it can adopt co-
ercive measures such as sanctions (freezing of resources, arms embargo, 
control of the trade of valuable natural resources, and restriction of dip-
lomatic relations, business partnerships, technological and trade coopera-
tion), or with military means by employing the multinational forces of the 
Un to establish safety zones as well as no-fly zones and in order to be a 
deterrent presence on the ground and at sea. Adding to this, for the execu-
tion of the R2P also several other actors can be involved in order to fulfill a 
variety of different functions. Apart from the States’ involvement, also the 
role played by the UN Human Rights Council, treaty bodies, the UN High 
Commissioner of Human Rights, UNICEF and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees are of the upmost importance for monitoring the observance 
of human rights. But also Regional and sub-regional organizations such as 
EU, AU, NATO, OECD, League of Arab States, ECOWAS, etc., humanitarian 
organizations, national and international CSOs as well as individuals (A/ 
66/874; S/2012/578) can be important players.
Up to present day, R2P has been recalled in 37 resolutions of the UN 
Security Council and in 44 public statements of the Joint Office of the 
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility 
to Protect, which has the duty to raise awareness about the causes and 
dynamics of genocide, alert relevant actors on the risk of genocide and 
mobilize support for prompt action and to lead the conceptual political, 
institutional and operational development of the R2P. Several peace-
keeping operations have been authorized in Africa as UNAMID (2007) in 
Sudan, UNMISS (2014) in South Sudan, MINUSCA (2014) in Central African 
Republic, AMISOM (2007) in Somalia, MINUSMA (2014) in Mali, MONUSCO 
(2010) in DR Congo, UNOCI (2015) in Cote d’Ivoire with the explicit aim 
to protect civilian population in compliance with art. 41 of Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. In 2011 heavy sanctions, which were applied to Libya, 
ended in NATO-led multilateral military mission harshly contested by 
Russia, China, India, Iran, etc. Despite the unequivocal evidence of mass 
atrocities and the use of chemical weapons, the failure to adopt coercive 
measures to the regime of Bashar al-Assad was «the death knell for the 
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new norm of R2P» (Murray & McKay 2014, 19). The preventive diploma-
cy initiative of the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to stem the 
violence that erupted in Kenya after the presidential elections in 2007 is 
widely proclaimed as «the best example of the implementation of the R2P» 
(Bellamy 2010, 154). Instead, cases of misuse of R2P resulted in one case 
from the non-approval of Russia’s request of intervention in Georgia due 
to the alleged abuses committed against civilians in South Ossetia by the 
Georgian government in 2008. In the other, from the little support gained 
by France in 2008 that requested the delivery of humanitarian aid to the 
starving population affected by Cyclone Nargys without the consent of 
the Burmese government which was accused of denying access to hu-
manitarian agencies. Also little recognition has been given to the demand 
for international measures made by the Palestinian National Authority, 
Qatar, Iran and the World Council of Churches in defense of the civilian 
population in Gaza, victims of military confrontation between Israel and 
Hamas between December 2008 and January 2009. Adding to this, no gen-
eral debate followed the demand for an appeal to the R2P in Sri Lanka in 
2008 coming from India, Norway and the Global Centre for Responsibility 
to Protect, or the demands voiced by the Havel- Bondevik-Wiesel’s com-
mission in 2008 for an international response to the continued violation 
of human rights in North Korea (see Bellamy 2010).
A wound to the moral basis of R2P
What is behind the general agreement on the R2P’s principles is the admis-
sion of the impossibility to prevent genocide, hence the exclusive focus of 
R2P’s doctrine on atrocity crimes. Even before the formulation of the R2P 
doctrine, the failure of genocide prevention had already been witnessed. 
In November 1999, a section entitled “lessons for the future” of the UN 
Secretary-General’s report The Fall of Srebrenica stated as follows: «Sre-
brenica crystallized a truth understood only too late by the United Na-
tions and the world at large: that Bosnia was as much a moral issue as a 
military conflict. The tragedy of Srebrenica will haunt our history forev-
er» (A/54/549, 108). Also, a letter sent the 15 December 1999 to the UN 
Secretary General from Independent Inquiry that was investigating on 
the conduct of the United Nations during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 
stated: «The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor 
did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun. This failure has left 
deep wounds within the Rwandan society, and in relationship between 
Rwanda and the international community, in particular the United Nations. 
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These are wounds which need to be healed, for the sake of the people of 
Rwanda and for the sake of the United Nations […]. Acknowledgement of 
responsibility must also be accompanied by a will for change: a commit-
ment to ensure that catastrophes such as the genocide in Rwanda never 
occur anywhere in the future» (S/1999/1257, 3). Connected to this, on 20 
September 1999, at the last session of the UN General Assembly of the XX 
century, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during the presentation of 
his annual report declared: «The genocide in Rwanda will define for our 
generation the consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder […] 
those for whom the greatest threat to the future of international order is 
the use of force in the absence of a Security Council without mandate, one 
might ask – not in the context of Kosovo – but in the context of Rwanda: 
If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of 
States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did 
not received prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have 
stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?» (SG/SM/7136). In this way, 
the failure represented by the complete lack of counter-measures inflict-
ed a wound so deep that it was generally thought that it could be healed 
only with the assertion of a new kind of moral responsibility capable of 
impeding such horrors from occurring again. This change of perspective 
will result in a moral commitment to readily oppose any form of extreme 
violence setting aside the role of spectator to assume that of a rescuer. It 
is exactly in this point where the central concern of R2P to «ending mass 
atrocities crimes once and for all» (see Evans 2008) must be framed.
Mass atrocity crimes: 1 the form and strategy of contemporary war
This new attitude has to take into account the difficulty to intervene effec-
tively in a preventive or deterrent way in the context of contemporary war-
fare, whose prevalent representation, accepted and advocated by many 
supporters of the R2P, corresponds to the model of the “new wars” theo-
ry. According to the thesis of the English scholar Mary Kaldor, the nature 
of the wars of the XXI century – and other similar wars that appeared on 
the global stage since the end of the Cold War – is “new” because of an 
inherent logic of organized violence (actors, objectives, methods, forms 
of financing) that profoundly differentiates them from the wars of the XIX 
and XX centuries. 2 Currently, there are 42 active armed conflicts: 26 are 
intra-state, 13 are internationalized intra-state, and only one is an inter-
state conflict. In 2015, thirteen conflicts have reached the level of inten-
sity of war, with more than 1000 victims per year. But at the same time, 
1 For a definition of 
“atrocity crimes” see 
Scheffer (2006). For 
the legal definition 
of crimes of mass 
atrocity consider the 
Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal 
Court, finalized in 
1998, effective in 2002 
and modified in 2010. 
It is important to 
underline that three 
permanent members 
of the UN Security 
Council – Russia, 
China and the US – 
have not yet ratified 
this fundamental 
document for the 
prevention of mass 
atrocities. 
 
2 For a critical 
reading of the “new
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since 1989 the number of armed conflicts has significantly decreased (see 
Themńer & Wallensteen 2014). Nevertheless, a disturbing increase in the 
intensity of political violence has been registered, considering not only the 
number of victims, but also the number of people forced to flee from their 
homes due to violence and persecution (see Inkster 2015; UNHCR Global 
Trends Forced Displacement 2014). 3
According to Kaldor’s view, from the standpoint of the actors directly 
involved, the “old wars” were fought by regular state armed forces, the 
“new” instead by variable combinations of networks of state and non-state 
actors – regular armed forces, private security agents, mercenaries, jihad-
ists, warlords, paramilitary groups, etc. While the “old wars” have been 
fought for geopolitical interests or in the name of ideologies – socialist, 
democratic, etc. – the basis of the “new wars” lies mostly upon “politics 
of identity” (ethnic, religious, tribal, etc.). The mass mobilization of identi-
ty is what propels these new forms of war, differently from the “old wars” 
where it had mainly a functional purpose. In the “old wars” the battle was 
the decisive moment where it was possible to conquer territories with the 
deployment of armies in the battle field. Conversely, in the “new wars” bat-
tles between opposed armed groups are far more uncommon. The forced 
displacement of populations and the overwhelming violence directed to-
wards innocent civilians, considered as enemies since they are thought as 
bearers of a political, religious or ethnic identity, is what allows the con-
flicting parties to take possession and keep control of territories. The “new 
wars”, unlike the “old” ones, most of the time are not funded by states or, 
as in the Cold War era, by the powers belonging to opposing ideological 
blocks, rather by predatory finance, that consists of looting civilians and 
humanitarian aid, pushing for Diaspora, robbing and smuggling oil, dia-
monds, drugs, people, etc. According to Clausewitz, the “old wars” were 
“acts of violence to compel the enemy to do our will” whose conclusion 
resulted into the disarmament of the enemy by using extreme and limit-
less physical violence (see Clausewitz 2000). On the contrary, “new wars” 
are “politically framed violent enterprises” that aim to expand and to per-
sist as long as possible: the victory of one of the parties involved depends 
on the capitalization of the economic and political violence. A key ele-
ment of this difference is the changing role of the State in relation to that 
of organized violence. «War makes state – wrote Charles Tilly, referring 
to the creation of modern European States – showing how in this rela-
tionship between war making and State making there is an analogy with 
organized crime thought as the legitimate protection of capital extor-
tion» (Evans, et al. 1985, 169-170). Consistently with this line of reasoning, 
Mary Kaldor argues that «whereas old wars were associated with State 
wars” thesis framed 
only on its conven-
tional version in this 
article, see Duy-
vesteyn-Angstrom, 
2005; Newman (2004); 
Kalyvas (2001); 
Berdal (2003).  
 
3 Data register 
49,000 dead in 2010 
and 180,000 in 2014. 
In 2014, out of 13.9 
million people who 
were obliged to 
flee their homes, 11 
million have been 
internally displaced 
and 2.9 million of 
refugees, four times 
as much than in 
2010. In 2014, overall 
59.5 million people 
are displaced (19.5 
refugees, 38.2 million 
IDPs and 1.8 asylum 
seekers), more than 
8 million compared 
to 2013. Since World 
War II, for the first 
time this figure has 
exceeded that of 50 
million displaced 
persons. Has the 
long-awaited World 
War III come? Is still 
the case to wait the 
WWIII in the form 
of apocalyptic and 
symmetrical clash 
between powerful 
state actors? A huge 
nation of displaced 
persons – the 
twenty-fourth most 
populous in the 
world is composed of 
a “people of interest” 






What can states do 
in the name of R2P 
with this people of 
dispossessed if its 
core aim is to prevent 
and halt mass 
atrocities? 
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building [new wars] tend to contribute to the dismantling of the State», 
that means: «On the one hand, the monopoly of violence is eroded from 
above, as some states are increasingly embedded in a set of internation-
al rules and institutions. On the other hand, the monopoly of violence is 
eroded from below as the other states become weaker under the impact 
of globalization» (Kaldor 2013, 3). The XXI century provides a threatening 
scenario consisting of “a progressive denationalization of war”, parallel to 
its large-scale privatization based on an economy characterized, on one 
side, by the merging of the use of force and business and, on the other, by 
the appearance of “entrepreneurs of violence” (such as warlords, guerril-
las, international organized crime) who are now occupying the belliger-
ent role of the States but without any rational interest to end a war (see 
Münkler 2002). In this particular scenario, the infamous quote from Titus 
Livy bellum se ipsum alet applies better than the Grotian formula pax finis 
belli. Indeed, this system does rest on itself: the dismantling of the state 
and its failure – annually reported in the Fund for Peace’s Fragile States 
Index – due to the erosion of the state monopoly on violence and the de-
nationalization and privatization of warfare on one side; the precarious and 
revocable sovereignty understood primarily as responsibility on the oth-
er. At the heart of this portrayal of contemporary wars there is the great-
est demonstration of the failure of the State in the form of mass atrocity 
crimes – the abyss represented by the always open possibility in failing to 
arrest genocide that motivated the assertion of R2P by the UN in the first 
place. Both in the form of human rights violation, as violence against civil-
ians, and in the form of crime, as organized violence for private ends, mass 
atrocities are an essential component of a mixture (including also war as 
organized violence for political purposes) that constitutes the nature of 
the “new wars” (see Kaldor 2013). These are the result of the possibility 
embedded in present day wars to turn into total wars – an unrestrained 
brutality associated with the blurring distinction between people, armies 
and governments (see Duffield 2002). Therefore, they can always poten-
tially become the extensions of a “degenerate war”. This possibility is not 
a necessary outcome, but it is always lurking between the very structural 
trend of modern warfare to go beyond its legitimate limits (as proven by 
the events of our recent past starting from the massacre that occurred 
behind the trenches during the Great War, the abuses of the Japanese 
in Nanjing, the Nazi atrocities in Soviet occupied territories, the Allied 
bombing in Dresden, the dropping of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, up to the countless wars of insurgency and counter-insurgency 
of the last century) by extending deliberately and systematically a war 
against an organized armed enemy to unarmed civilians, and genocide 
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itself as the complete destruction of a group of civilians carried by organ-
ized armed forces (see Shaw 2003). Due to the approximation for which 
civilians are targeted as enemies to be destroyed, encouraging in this way 
the very logic of degenerated wars in its tension between discriminato-
ry victimization and indiscriminate results, genocide becomes a “peculiar 
form of warfare”. In this perspective, it is not surprising that the perpetra-
tion of mass atrocity crimes against unarmed civilians becomes a viable 
strategy to achieve victory. For this very reason that the essential idea 
behind responsibility to protect as a global strategy for the prevention of 
international crimes and as a counter-genocidal tactic becomes decisive 
(see Hubert & Blätter 2012; Scheffer 2008).
Iraq and Syria: wars at risk of R2P
With the expression “population at risk” the Global Centre for Responsi-
bility to Protect defines the object of application of the R2P’s strategy of 
human protection, with the intent to target “situations where populations 
are experiencing, or are at risk of, genocide, war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity or ethnic cleansing”. The monitoring activities of the Global Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect reveals that currently the countries where 
the R2P could be viable are Syria, Sudan, South Sudan and Iraq, countries 
where mass atrocities are currently underway and therefore in need for 
urgent measures. Focusing on the cases of the Iraq and Syria, it will be 
more easily shown the inability of the governments of these countries 
to fully exercise their own sovereignty due to the violence perpetrated 
against its own citizens.
The wars in Syria and Iraq are non-international armed conflicts, a kind 
of internationalized intra-state wars characterized by the fact of being 
internal wars between state and non-state actors, thus implying that the 
civilians become the main targets of the conflicting parties, in a space with 
no determinate borders and where there is no clear distinction between 
regular and irregular forces, combatants and civilians, aid workers and lo-
cals. Since the beginning of 2014 in Iraq many private militias and security 
forces of the Iraqi government, supported by the forces of national mobi-
lization of al-Hashd al-Shaabi (a coalition of more than 40 Shiite militias), 
Pershmerga Kurds and the Inherent Resolve Operation (a task force led by 
the US), were deployed against ISIS which is in turn supported by loyalists 
of the Baath Party and some Sunni Salafi rebel movements. In the Syrian 
civil war the government armed forces are facing the Syrian Revolutionary 
Command Council (an alliance composed of 72 factions) which is supported 
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by the Salafi-jihadist Jahbat Al Nusra Front, ISIS and the Supreme Kurdish 
Committee whose support is decisive for the Operation Inherent Resolve. 
These conflicts are clear examples of a “degenerate war”: the war strategy 
on both sides is explicitly criminal. In Iraq the counter-terrorist operations 
undertaken by regular and irregular government forces, in particular by 
the volunteers of the Popular Mobilization Forces, to contrast the advance 
of ISIS fighters – responsible for the attempted genocide of the Yazidi and 
crimes against humanity against Christians, Shabaks, Turkmen, Faili Kurds, 
Kaka’es, etc. (A/HRC/28/18; A/HRC/S-22/NGO/15) – resulted in serious vi-
olations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses such 
as summary executions, torture, abductions, forced evacuation and also 
attacks against Sunni civilians accused of being ISIS supporters. This man-
ifestly shows «the failure by the government to protect the people under 
its jurisdiction» and that «Iraqis have been deprived of their fundamental 
right to security» (A/HRC/28/18, 14). The Syrian government, with the sup-
port of paramilitary troops (the so called shabbiha), Hezbollah, the Shiite 
Iraqi militias and national defense forces, has launched widespread and 
systematic attacks against civilians, pursuing a strategy of self-survival 
portrayed by its own victims as “draining the sea to kill the fish” [tansheef 
al bakhar]. Some of the tactics employed consisted in enclosing whole ar-
eas by setting up checkpoints in all access points, the imposition of a state 
of siege, cutting-off basic necessities such as food, medicines, water and 
electricity, the bombing of besieged areas, the arrest and disappearance 
of people who attempted to leave those areas (A/HRC/28/69). Although 
it may be inappropriate to use the term “genocide” (even though the US-
based organization Genocide Watch issued a warning in February 2012) 
since there is no clear intent from the Assad regime to eliminate the Syrian 
Sunni population completely, nevertheless operations of extreme sectarian 
violence conducted in some areas (especially in Latakia and Homs) with 
the intent to remove by force Sunni males –from 15 to 60 years – and con-
solidate Alawite presence, does indeed reveal the intention to eliminate 
at least part of the population (Hof & Simon 2013, 34). Non-state armed 
groups have been responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
For example, the Free Syrian Army took civilians living in areas loyal to the 
regime as hostages. Or the Jabhat Al-Nusra Front, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated 
jihadist group, launched suicide attacks and car bombs against villages 
inhabited by small groups of civilians perceived as supporters of the gov-
ernment. And, after the proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014, ISIS 
pursued a strategy of strong social control through a coercive and punitive 
administration, that on one hand used forced evacuations and killings of 
ethnic and religious minorities to discourage any form of resistance, and 
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on the other used financial incentives and basic services to pacify the ci-
vilians (A/HRC/28/69; see Lewis 2014). The Syrian State is held responsible 
for this humanitarian disaster that counts up to 230,000 dead, 3.9 million 
refugees, 6.5 million internally displaced persons, 10.8 million civilians in 
need of assistance, 4.6 million residents in areas cut off from humanitar-
ian assistance. In fact not only it had manifestly failed to protect its own 
citizens from mass atrocities, but it also participated directly and actively 
in the perpetration of these atrocities, and therefore the opposition forces 
and the UN Security Council have to be considered also partly responsible 
(A/HRC/28/69). Consequently, if these mass atrocities are ascribable to an 
intentional war strategy pursued by both contending parties, necessary 
for them to survive and for the war to endure, what strategy can be em-
ployed to oppose the escalation of organized violence?
Minimum R2P: militarism risk-transfer
From what we have seen R2P is essentially an instrument for the inter-
national prevention of atrocities by non-coercive and coercive with a 
three-dimensional character: preventive, reactive and reconstructive. Its 
application case-by-case depends on a question of proportionality, ac-
cording to the connection between internal/individual responsibility and 
external/collective responsibility: the more the former counts, the less the 
latter will become invasive. The triggering of collective responsibility has 
not to be considered as always directed towards those who hold state 
power, but also towards civilians as well according to their mortality rate. 
Indeed, as the violence rises and becomes more brutal, there will be less 
space for preventive counter-measures. With a higher intensity of physi-
cal, social and psychological destruction, the operations of reconstruction 
will become more and more decisive. If the atrocities did not come over-
night but proliferated within the existing dynamics of deep institutional 
instability and collective aggression, then prevention must operate within 
this space where these dire consequences are already foreseen.
When populations are at high risk as demonstrated above in the cases 
of Syria and Iraq, the possibilities for adequate preventive measures always 
become narrow. Prevention, as the main duty of each State and indirect-
ly of the international community, consists in the constant effort to build 
society’s opposition against atrocities, but, in spite of its assigned priority 
within the R2P doctrine, it always risks to have its space of maneuver re-
duced to a point that it necessarily has to turn into a reactive form of direct 
counter-measure. As a matter of fact, the reaction against forms of extreme 
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and widespread violence and the physical protection of human life from 
systematic abuse has nothing to do with «addressing both the root caus-
es and direct causes of the internal conflicts and other man-made crises 
putting population at risk» (ICISS Report 2001, xi) nor with the pursuit of a 
“positive peace” – a condition defined by the absence of structural violence 
– but results in the the achievement of a “negative peace” – defined instead 
by the lack of direct violence (see Galtung & Fischer 2013). In countries on 
the brink of genocide, preventive strategies such as early warning systems 
based on the analysis of specific risk factors of different forms of mass 
atrocities (Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes 2014), early preven-
tion focused on leadership, institutions and civil society aimed at reducing 
both the capacity and motivation to mass violence while increasing social 
and institutional safeguards and preventive diplomacy to halt and reverse 
conflict escalation (USHMM 2008) too often are neglected and replaced by 
military options. This extreme narrowing of the preventive dimension in 
favor of more reactive options is evident in both Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the 
failure of two peace negotiations, the vetoes of Russia and China against 
some of the measures to deter the perpetration of mass atrocities, the fail-
ure to implement the intercessions approved by the UN Security Council 
in Syria and the extreme brutality of ISIS against ethnic and religious mi-
norities in Iraq, have all had a major contribution in giving way to military 
operations. With Operation Inherent Resolve, commenced for the first time 
in Iraq on 8 August 2014 with the primary purpose to “help save Iraqi civil-
ians” – according to US president Obama – the protection of civilians from 
atrocities becomes embedded in a counter-terrorism strategy flattened 
merely on a kind of “risk-transfer militarism” (Shaw 2002). Through an es-
timation of the distribution of death, the international subject 4 is assigned 
to rescue the populations at risk, preferring in this way small massacres 
of civilians – according to the latest data roughly 578/732 victims in Iraq 
and 291-354 victims in Syria (Airwars 2015) – to the escalated violence of 
a degenerate war, pushing on the allies the risk of military casualties on 
the battlefield (ex. Iraqi government, Kurdish Peshmerga). Embodying the 
face of the new Western conception of war, the application of R2P leaves 
people to die on a small scale in order to not allow others to kill on a large 
scale. In this way the invasiveness is at its peak by affecting directly the 
lives of civilians, and therefore this new indirect sovereignty truly becomes 
the denial of the responsibility to protect. The face of what could possibly 
be a new global standard designed to ensure international peace is thus 
revealed: war is accepted but only with a low cost in terms of human lives. 
The affinities with the new American way to wage genocide – mass atrocity 
response operation (see Sewall et al. 2010) – are anything but far. 
4 An international 
US-led operation 
that involves more 
than 30 countries, 
among the most 
active in the 




Jordan, Turkey and 
Morocco, beside 
these countries in 
Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Unit-
ed Arab Emirates 
give military support.
PHILOSOPHY KITCHEN ANNO 2, N. 3 – 2015. ISSN 2385-1945
WARGAMES. STRATEGIE, RELAZIONI, RAPPRESENTAZIONI 76
– SALVATORE LODDO –
R2P: A COUNTER-GENOCIDAL STRATEGY OF PEACE?
Conclusion
War and peace are the opposite sides of the same coin. Although paradox-
ically, war is nothing but an instrument for peace keeping, since in reality 
its only scope is to achieve peace (see Bonanate 1998). As a matter of fact, 
it is possible to say that there is an existing link between a certain meth-
od of warfare and its corresponding way to achieve peace (see Dillon & 
Reid 2001). The liberal perspective on war and peace are incarnated in a 
new widely shared international global standard that is the R2P, which is 
nothing more than an instrument of global governance. Visions and strat-
egies for security, war and peace implied in this norm are framed within 
the prevailing representation of contemporary armed conflicts and the 
moral imperative to contrast genocidal violence. Revocable sovereignty 
and protection of the population at risk are the means by which the global 
governance conveyed by the widespread approval of the R2P regulates 
international power relationships. Although, the liberal project to maintain 
international peace and security through the widening of the international 
human rights system has in itself structural flaws. On the one hand, the 
very changing nature of contemporary conflicts, which are highly unpre-
dictable and problematic, defies any attempt of solution. Therefore, a trans-
formative and dynamic approach to conflict becomes necessary. On the 
other hand, the guilt for the lack of action in the past still haunts the UN 
Security Council in its powerlessness to impede modern day massacres. In 
this sense, exceptions to the right of veto by the permanent members need 
to be implemented. In fact it becomes clear that war is an instrument for 
peace precisely where the main obstacles to the liberal project for peace 
are more pronounced. In the moment when the main subject of indirect 
sovereignty is highly ineffective and the conflict becomes extremely in-
tractable, as shown by the Syrian case, in order to not stand by again and 
to avoid the worst, the liberal method of warfare takes place as a bio-po-
litical calculation. In pursuing a narrow concept of peace, which merely 
coincides in stopping mass atrocities, the R2P overlaps with a politics of 
distribution of death. The manifested contradiction between means and 
ends – kill less to protect most of the population as possible – challenges 
the moral imperative underlying the R2P.
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